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 ABSTRACT 
Partial Information Sharing in Cournot Oligopoly 
by Jos Jansen* 
We study the incentives of Cournot oligopolists to acquire and disclose 
information on a common cost (or demand) parameter. Since information 
acquisition is such that firms may fail to acquire information, firms can credibly 
conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. This paper 
compares the incentives, profits and welfare under such a partial disclosure 
regime with the regimes where firms commit to share all or no information. We 
show that, for su.ciently low (high) information acquisition costs, a firm (antitrust 
authority) prefers voluntary disclosure to precommitment. Moreover, incentives 
and expected profits are often non-monotonic in the amount of information 
disclosed. 
 
Keywords:  Cournot competition, information acquisition, information sharing, 
commitment,common value 
JEL Classification:  D82, D83, L13, L40 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Teilweise Offenlegung von Informationen im Cournot Oligopol 
Wir untersuchen den Anreiz von Cournot-Oligopolisten, Informationen über 
einen gemeinsamen Kosten- (oder Nachfrage-) Parameter zu erlangen und 
diese offen zu legen. Da die Bemühungen der Firmen, Informationen zu 
erlangen, auch fehlschlagen können, können sie ungünstige Informationen 
glaubwürdig unterschlagen und günstige offen legen. In diesem Beitrag werden 
die Anreize für eine derartige teilweise Offenlegungsstrategie, sowie die 
resultierenden Gewinne und die soziale Wohlfahrt mit denen verglichen, die 
sich für die Festlegung auf völlige Offenlegung oder völlige Unterdrückung der 
Information ergeben. Wir zeigen, dass ein Unternehmen (die Wettbewerbs-
behörde) freiwillige Offenlegung einer Festlegung auf entweder vollständige 
Offenlegung oder vollständige Unterdrückung vorzieht, wenn die Kosten der 
Informationsgewinnung genügend niedrig (hoch) sind. Außerdem sind die 
Anreize und die erwarteten Gewinne nicht monoton im Ausmaß der 
Offenlegung. 
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Michal Grajek, Sjaak Hurkens, Doh-Shin Jeon, and participants of seminars at CentER (Tilburg 
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comments. Naturally, all errors are mine. 
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1 Introduction
A firm that introduces a new product in a market does not always know the demand
for the product or its production cost. The firm can do market research to learn the
demand or cost. Doing market research is both costly and risky. The firm needs
to invest in the acquisition of relevant information. An investment in information
acquisition may generate the valuable information, but may also fail to do so. The
firm may also learn about the properties of the new product through information
disclosed by the firm’s competitors. But competitors know the role their information
plays for the firm, and will bias the information they share to their strategic advantage.
Clearly, the firm’s incentives to acquire and share information are related, and have an
impact on the firm’s production incentives. This paper studies the interaction between
information acquisition, information sharing, and output supply, and analyzes the
consequences for the firms’ profits and social welfare. How much information will a
Cournot oligopolist disclose to its rivals? And how much information should a welfare-
maximizing antitrust authority allow firms to share? Should firms be mandated to
disclose all information, should they be required to conceal all, or should coordination
on information sharing be forbidden, and let firms disclose strategically?
These questions are addressed in the literature on information sharing in oligopolis-
tic markets since the 1980s.1 Most papers in that literature analyze the incentives
of firms under two extreme information disclosure regimes: full information sharing,
and no pooling of information. Such an analysis is especially appropriate if firms
can precommit to information sharing, e.g. by establishing a trade association, or
through government regulation. But, even without precommitment, there are condi-
tions under which one of these extreme disclosure regimes emerges endogenously from
the strategic information sharing choices of firms. For example, Ziv (1993) observes
that strategic firms will not reveal their information truthfully, if information is non-
verifiable and revelation is costless. On the other hand, if there are no verification
and disclosure costs, and if it is known that firms have information, then often the
unraveling result holds. If this powerful result applies, then strategic firms will dis-
close all information, since they cannot credibly conceal unfavorable news, e.g. see
Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and Okuno-Fujiwara et al (1990).
However, in markets for new products, where information acquisition plays an im-
portant role, the focus on the two extreme information regimes may be too restrictive.
1For recent surveys of this literature, see Kühn and Vives (1995), Raith (1996), and Vives (1999).
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If a firm’s market research can turn out to be fruitless, in which case the firm remains
uninformed, it is no longer known whether firms are informed. Consequently, the un-
raveling result may fail to hold, as e.g. Dye (1985) and Farrell (1986) observe. In that
case, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news (by claiming to be uninformed),
while they disclose favorable news. The economic consequences of such a regime of
partial disclosure in oligopolistic markets are not well established. This paper intends
to fill the gap.
We study how incentives and profits of firms under partial information disclosure
compare with the incentives and profits under the two precommitment regimes. Natu-
rally, partial disclosure is chosen by firms that cannot precommit. Moreover, we show
that, even if firms can precommit to full or no sharing, there are instances where firms
prefer voluntary disclosure to precommitment.
We analyze a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods where firms invest in
performing market research to learn a common cost or demand parameter. If market
research is successful, firms learn the cost or demand for their new product. But if
market research fails, firms do not learn. Naturally, the probability of success increases
in the amount that a firm invests in research. Hence, if it is too costly to invest in
certain success, there is uncertainty about whether a firm is informed. In such an
environment firms have an incentive to partially disclose information they learned,
i.e. they disclose bad news (high cost or low demand), while they conceal good news
(low cost or high demand) to discourage their rivals. Under such a partial disclosure
regime firms disclose more information than under no pooling of information, since
bad news is disclosed, but less than under full information sharing, since good news
is concealed. That is, the amount of disclosed information in the market is between
full sharing and no sharing of information. Does this imply that the firms’ incentives
and profits will be between those under full and no sharing? Interestingly, we show
that this is often not the case.
We find that, for a given level of information acquisition investments, the expected
equilibrium profit under partial information disclosure may be lowest. That is, we can
find levels of information acquisition investments for which the expected equilibrium
profit under both precommitment regimes exceeds the expected profit under partial
disclosure. Furthermore, we show that a firm’s expected equilibrium profit under
partial disclosure is lower than under one of the precommitment regimes, for given
levels of information acquisition investment. Hence, if the probability of receiving
information were exogenous, firms would be better oﬀ by precommitting to either full
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or no information sharing. If the probability of receiving information is endogenously
determined by firms’ information acquisition investments, however, this preference for
precommitment can be reversed.
In particular, we show that overall profits, i.e. the expected profit given equilib-
rium levels of information acquisition, are highest under partial information disclosure
for suﬃciently low costs of information acquisition. Hence, for low costs of investment
firms are better oﬀ if they do not precommit to either of the extreme information
sharing rules. Conversely, for high costs of investment, overall expected profits are
lowest under partial disclosure. And for any cost of information acquisition the overall
expected equilibrium profits under full and no disclosure are identical in our model.
That is, overall expected profits are never monotonic in the amount of disclosed in-
formation.
Endogenizing the probability with which firms receive information matters greatly
for welfare as well. The introduction of costly information acquisition investments,
reverses the welfare ranking of equilibria under full and no information sharing.
Moreover, if information acquisition is very costly, expected welfare may be great-
est under partial disclosure. Partial disclosure may therefore arise, because a welfare-
maximizing antitrust authority prohibits precommitment to information sharing rules.
Whether information arrives exogenously, or is actively acquired by firms is therefore
of crucial importance for welfare-maximizing policy makers.
The incentives to acquire information are not always monotonic in the amount
of information disclosed in the industry either. It seems intuitive that the more
information firms share, the greater the free-rider incentives, and, consequently, the
lower the firms’ information acquisition investments. For low costs of information
acquisition, we do, indeed, obtain this intuitive result. But for intermediate costs of
investment the free-rider eﬀect of public information does not always play a dominant
role, as we show in section 5. For these cost levels firms invest more in information
acquisition under partial disclosure than under no disclosure.
Papers in the accounting literature, such as Darrough (1993) and Sankar (1995),
study related models. These papers focus on strategic disclosure incentives, but they
do not analyze consequences for expected profits and welfare. Interestingly, also the
duopolistic information sharing models in Nalebuﬀ and Zeckhauser (1986, model A)
and Malueg and Tsutsui (1998, example 1) are consistent with ours. But, while these
papers make profit comparisons for the regimes under disclosure precommitment, they
ignore the opportunity for partial disclosure. Our paper studies the consequences of
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partial disclosure for incentives, profits and welfare, by comparing voluntary disclosure
with the two precommitment regimes.
The aforementioned papers treat the probability of receiving information as ex-
ogenous parameters. We show that endogenizing this probability matters greatly for
the firms’ expected profits and for social welfare. There are papers, such as Li et
al (1987), Hwang (1995), and Hauk and Hurkens (2001), that study the informa-
tion acquisition incentives of Cournot oligopolists.2 These papers assume that firms
do not disclose their acquired information, and make complementary comparisons.
Conversely, papers, such as Matthews and Postlewaite (1985), Verrecchia (1990), and
Shavell (1994), study the interaction between a monopolist’s incentives to acquire
and disclose information, i.e. these papers ignore externalities from product market
competition. Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) studies the information acquisition and
disclosure incentives of competing firms in a very diﬀerent context, i.e. a financial mar-
ket. An important diﬀerence with our analysis is that firms in Admati and Pfleiderer
commit ex ante to disclosure rules, whereas we study interim disclosure incentives.
Empirical findings on strategic information sharing in Krishnan et al (1999), Doyle
and Snyder (1999), and Genesove and Mullin (1997) are consistent with our assump-
tions and results. Krishnan et al (1999) confirms that financial market participants
infer that firms selectively disclose earnings evidence, and adjust their beliefs on the
firm’s value accordingly, as in Shin (1994, 2003). Doyle and Snyder (1999) finds that
US car makers’ announcements of production plans are informative, and not mere
cheap talk, since they aﬀect market outcomes. Furthermore, the car makers share
information about a common demand parameter, which creates the same product
market responses as in our paper: “Specifically, rival firms tend to adjust their pro-
duction upward in response to an announcement of aggressive production” (Doyle and
Snyder, 1999, p. 1329). Genesove and Mullin (1997) makes a related observation on
US sugar cane refiners participating in the Sugar Institute trade association between
1928 and 1936. The paper finds no indication that the association’s members were
making untruthful reports. The authors observe that “it may be too diﬃcult to con-
struct a credible, systematic lie, since a variety of bits of information, both internal
and external to the firm, have to be made consistent with any false report” (Genesove
and Mullin, 1997, p. 7). This suggests that the reported statistics can be verified. We
adopt this as a assumption. Moreover, some instances were found where individual
2Persico (2000) studies the incentives for secret information acquisition of bidders in auction
models with aﬃliated values.
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members withheld information from the Sugar Institute. Again, this empirical finding
is consistent with the assumptions and results of our paper.
Ackert et al (2000) provides experimental support for the partial disclosure rules
that we study in this paper. The experiment confirms that Cournot duopolists do
indeed use partial disclosure strategies on a common cost parameter to discourage
their rival.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium outputs under the regimes of information sharing,
full concealment, and partial disclosure, where firms only disclose if the cost is high.
Furthermore, we compare equilibrium profits and welfare of the three regimes. Section
4 studies the interim information disclosure incentives. In section 5 we analyze the
incentives to invest in information acquisition. Moreover, we show there how the
profit and welfare analysis is aﬀected by endogenizing information acquisition. Finally,
section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider an industry where N firms compete in quantities of a homogeneous good
(N ≥ 2). Firms have identical constant marginal production costs, θ. This common
cost is unknown to the firms.3 The cost is either low or high, i.e. θ ∈ {θ, θ} with
0 ≤ θ < θ, where the probability of having low (high) cost is q (resp. 1 − q), with
0 < q < 1.
In the first stage firms can learn their cost by acquiring information. Firms choose
their information acquisition investments, ri ∈ [0, 1] for firm i, simultaneously. Infor-
mation acquisition investments are not observable. Firm i expects its N − 1 rivals
invest r in information acquisition. The costs of information acquisition are linear in
investment: c(ri) = ηri, with η > 0 for i = 1, .., N . After investing in information
acquisition firm i receives a signal, Θi, about its cost. With probability ri firm i learns
its true cost, Θi = θ, but with probability 1 − ri the firm learns nothing, Θi = ∅.
Hence the more a firm invests in information acquisition, the more likely it is that the
firm will be informed. The signals are independent, conditional on θ.4
In stage 2 each firm chooses whether to disclose or conceal its signal. The infor-
3Naturally, this model is conceptually identical to a model with incomplete information about a
common demand intercept. Hence, all results hold for this model as well.
4Notice that this model, like most oligopolistic information sharing models, satisfies the linear
conditional expectation property.
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mation that firms acquire is verifiable. However, the fact whether or not a firm is
informed is not verifiable. If firm i receives information θ, it can choose to either
disclose or conceal this, i.e. the firm chooses its message δi(θ) from the set {θ,∅}.
An uninformed firm can only state δi(∅) = ∅. It therefore suﬃces to denote firm i’s
disclosure rule as (δi(θ), δi(θ)). Firms make their disclosure decisions simultaneously.
In the final stage firms simultaneously choose the quantities they supply to con-
sumers, xi for firm i.
The payoﬀs are as follows. Consumers’ gross surplus of consuming quantity X is:
S(X) ≡ αX − 1
2
βX2, with X ≡
NX
j=1
xj. (2.1)
Hence, the inverse demand function is linear in total output, i.e. P (X) = α − βX.
Firm i’s profit of producing quantity xi at marginal cost θ is:
πi(x; θ) = (P (X)− θ)xi, (2.2)
with x = (x1, .., xN). Firms are risk-neutral. Net consumers’ surplus, given total
quantity X, equals gross consumers’ surplus minus expenditures: CS(X) = S(X) −
P (X)X = 1
2
βX2. Social welfare, given total quantity X and marginal cost θ, is the
sum of net consumers’ surplus and industry profits:
W (X) ≡ 1
2
βX2 + (P (X)− θ)X. (2.3)
In the remainder of the paper we make the normalization β = 1 to save on notation.
We solve the game backwards, and restrict the analysis to symmetric, pure-strategy
(Bayes perfect) equilibria.
3 Production
We first study the equilibrium outputs, profits and welfare for given symmetric dis-
closure rules, and information acquisition investments. In particular, we consider
three disclosure regimes. First, we study production under the two regimes that are
extensively studied in the literature on information sharing in oligopoly, i.e. the full
information sharing regime, f , and the no sharing regime, o. In the full sharing regime
the firms disclose all available information, i.e. (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (θ, θ) for i = 1, .., N . In
the no sharing regime the disclosure rules are uniformative, i.e. (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (∅,∅)
for i = 1, .., N . We call these regimes the precommitment regimes, since they may
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emerge if firms can commit ex ante to disclosure rules. Besides regimes f and o, we
analyze production under the partial information sharing regime, p. Under partial
disclosure firms conceal low cost information while they disclose high cost informa-
tion, i.e. the firms’ disclosure rules are (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (∅, θ) for i = 1, .., N . We show
in section 4 that such a partial disclosure regime is chosen in equilibrium if firms do
not precommit.
3.1 Equilibrium Outputs
We first study the equilibrium outputs and profits under information sharing, i.e.
regime f . Since the costs are perfectly positively correlated, firms learn about the
cost from their own acquired signal, and from information disclosed by rivals. We
distinguish two cases. The first case is one in which firms produce under complete
information. Whenever one of the firms receives an informative signal, Θi = θ for
i ∈ {1, .., N} and θ ∈ {θ, θ}, all firms know that the cost is θ, i.e. E(θ|θ) = θ.
We denote this case by Θ0 = θ. Second, there is the case in which firms remain
uninformed, denoted by Θ0 = ∅, if (Θ1, ..,ΘN) = (∅, ..,∅). In this case firms expect
marginal cost E(θ|∅) = qθ + (1− q)θ, and maximize ex ante expected profits.
Firm i’s first-order condition of profit maximization with respect to output xi,
given Θ0 ∈ {θ, θ,∅}, is as follows (for i, j = 1, .., N):
2βxi(Θ0) = α− E(θ|Θ0)−
X
j 6=i
xj(Θ0). (3.1)
These first-order conditions give the following equilibrium outputs (forΘ0 ∈ {θ, θ,∅}):
xf(Θ0) =
α−E(θ|Θ0)
N + 1
. (3.2)
This is a standard result for oligopolies with Cournot competition.
Second, consider the equilibrium under no pooling of information, i.e. regime o. If
all firms commit to conceal their information, maximization of expected profit results
in the following first-order conditions (for Θi ∈ {θ, θ,∅} and i, j = 1, .., N):
2βxi(Θi) = α−E(θ|Θi)−
X
j 6=i
[rE(xj(θ)|Θi) + (1− r)xj(∅)] . (3.3)
Using symmetry, we obtain that firm i’s equilibrium output under full concealment is
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as follows (for Θi ∈ {θ, θ,∅} and i = 1, .., N):5
xo(Θi) = x
f(Θi) +
(N − 1)(1− r)(E(θ)−E(θ|Θi))
(N + 1)[2 + (N − 1)r] . (3.4)
We can conclude the following from comparing the first-order conditions (3.1) and
(3.3). A firm with a low (high) cost signal expects more pessimistic (optimistic) rivals
under no information sharing than under full sharing, and, consequently, produces
more (less) in equilibrium.
Finally, we study the output equilibrium under partial disclosure, where informed
ineﬃcient firms disclose while eﬃcient firms conceal, i.e. regime p. Naturally, when-
ever there is a firm that discloses high production cost, all firms supply xfi (θ). If no
firm discloses information, then firms infer that there is no firm that received a high
cost signal (Θj 6= θ for all j = 1, .., N). In that case, an informed firm (Θi = θ) as-
signs probability r to competing against an informed rival j (Θj = θ), and probability
1 − r to facing an uninformed rival (Θj = ∅). Each uninformed firm expects costeE(θ) ≡ eqθ + (1− eq)θ, with posterior belief:
eq ≡ q
q + (1− q)(1− r)N−1 . (3.5)
The uninformed firm assigns probability req (resp. 1 − req) to competing against an
informed (uninformed) firm j. Hence firm i’s reaction functions after no information
disclosure, and beliefs consistent with partial disclosure, are as follows (i, j = 1, .., N):
2βxi(θ) = α− θ −
X
j 6=i
[rxj(θ) + (1− r)xj(∅)] , and (3.6)
2βxi(∅) = α− eE(θ)−X
j 6=i
[reqxj(θ) + (1− req)xj(∅)] . (3.7)
Using symmetry and property [2+(1−eq)(N−1)]x(∅) = 2eqx(θ)+(1−eq)(N +1)x(θ),
we derive the following equilibrium outputs:
xp(θ) =
[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r](α− θ) + (N − 1)(1− r)³ eE(θ)− θ´
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r] , (3.8)
xp(∅) =
[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]³α− eE(θ)´− (N − 1)r ³ eE(θ)− θ´
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r] . (3.9)
5The property E{xi(θ)} = xi(∅), which follows immediately from the first-order conditions (3.3),
can be applied to simplify the derivation of equilibrium outputs.
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An informed, eﬃcient firm has the same first-order condition under partial disclosure
as under no information sharing. Under partial disclosure an uninformed firm is more
optimistic about its cost of production, but expects more optimistic, “aggressive”
rivals than under the precommitment regimes. We show in lemma 1 that the cost
eﬀect dominates, i.e. xf(∅) = xo(∅) < xp(∅). This implies in turn, through first-
order condition (3.3) for Θi = θ and (3.6), that informed, eﬃcient firms produce less
under partial disclosure than under no disclosure.
So far we compared the equilibrium outputs for a given cost signal. We can use
these comparisons to study the ex ante expected industry output (and price). First,
the equilibrium outputs satisfy the properties E{x`(θ)} = x`(∅) for ` ∈ {f, o}, and
xf(∅) = xo(∅). This implies that the expected industry output under full disclosure is
identical to the expected industry output under no disclosure. Second, if we compare
the ex ante expected industry outputs under full disclosure and partial disclosure, we
obtain the following trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, for a given signal Θ, each firm’s
output is smallest under full disclosure, i.e. xf(Θ) ≤ xp(Θ). On the other hand, it
is more likely that firms receive a low cost signal under full disclosure. We show in
lemma 1 (iii) that the latter eﬀect dominates the former. Consequently, the expected
industry output is highest under full disclosure.
Lemma 1 For all r ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium outputs are such that:
(i) xf(θ) < xp(θ) < xo(θ), xf(θ) = xp(θ) > xo(θ), and xf(∅) = xo(∅) < xp(∅);
(ii) ∂xp(θ)/∂r < 0, ∂xp(∅)/∂r > 0, and ∂xo(θ)/∂r < 0, ∂xo(θ)/∂r > 0.
(iii) For ri = r ex ante expected equilibrium price is highest under partial disclosure,
i.e. E{Xf(Θ0)} = E{Xo(Θi)} > E{Xp(Θi)}.
Furthermore, if r = 0, xp(Θ) = xo(Θ) for Θ ∈ {θ,∅}, and xf(θ) = xp(θ), while if
r = 1, xf(θ) = xp(θ) = xp(∅) = xo(θ), and xf(θ) = xo(θ).
Under each regime `, given information Θ ∈ {θ, θ,∅} and equilibrium output
x`(Θ), a firm’s expected equilibrium profit equals: π`(Θ) = x`(Θ)2 for ` ∈ {f, o, p}.
Hence, the comparisons of lemma 1 (i)-(ii) also hold for expected profits. These
comparisons play therefore an important role in the analysis below.
3.2 Expected Profits
In this subsection we compare expected equilibrium profits under the three disclosure
regimes for given (symmetric) information acquisition investments. This analysis is
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instructive to evaluate the eﬀect of endogenizing information acquisition investments
on the expected equilibrium profits (see section 5).
The expected equilibrium profits of firm i under regime `, given information acqui-
sition investment ri and expected investments r, are (for i = 1, .., N and ` ∈ {f, o, p}):
Π`(ri, r) = E
©
π`(θ)
ª
− ψ`(r) + ri
£
ψ`(r)− η
¤
, (3.10)
where
ψf(r) ≡ (1− r)N−1
£
E
©
πf(θ)
ª
− πf(∅)
¤
, (3.11)
ψo(r) ≡ E{πo(θ)}− πo(∅), and (3.12)
ψp(r) ≡ q [πp(θ)− πp(∅)] + (1− q)(1− r)N−1
£
πp(θ)− πp(∅)
¤
. (3.13)
The first part of expression (3.10), i.e. E
©
π`(θ)
ª
− ψ`(r), is the expected profit of
information acquired through the disclosure by rivals. For example, disclosure by
competitors yields expected profit [1− (1− r)N−1]E{πf(θ)}+ (1− r)N−1πf(∅) for a
firm under full disclosure, while it yields only πo(∅) under no disclosure. The second
part of (3.10), i.e. ri[ψ
`(r) − η], is the expected profit earned from the firm’s own
information acquisition investment. In fact, the functions ψ`(r) in (3.11)-(3.13) are the
firm’s marginal revenues of information acquisition under regime ` with ` ∈ {f, o, p}.
These functions will play a central role in section 5, where we discuss the information
acquisition incentives of firms.
First, we compare the expected profit under full information sharing with the
expected profit under full concealment. This comparison gives the following trade-oﬀ.
On the one hand, a firm’s expected profit, conditional on receiving no information
from competitors, is greater under full concealment than under full disclosure, i.e.
riE{πo(θ)}+ (1− ri)πo(∅) > riE{πf(θ)}+ (1− ri)πf(∅). On the other hand, firms
are more likely to be informed under full disclosure for given levels of information
acquisition. The expected profit gain of obtaining information through disclosure by
others is positive, since E{πf(θ)} > πf(∅). Notice that this trade-oﬀ diﬀers from
the trade-oﬀ in the usual information sharing literature. For symmetric information
acquisition investments and fulfilled beliefs, i.e. ri = r, our trade-oﬀ results in a
critical value r∗N , with 0 < r
∗
N ≤ 1. For information acquisition investments below
r∗N expected profits are highest under full concealment. For investments above r
∗
N
expected profits are highest under full information sharing, as we show in proposition
1 below. In fact, we can show that r∗2 ≈ 0.30 and r∗3 ≈ 0.62, while r∗N = 1 for all
N ≥ 4. Nalebuﬀ and Zeckhauser (1986), and Malueg and Tsutsui (1998) obtain this
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result for the duopoly model. Our contribution is to show that this result is somewhat
special, since it disappears in oligopolies with more than three firms. In oligopolies
with more than three firms the expected profits are always greatest under no pooling
of information, as in standard information sharing models, see e.g. Li (1985).
The comparison between expected profits under full and partial information shar-
ing results in the following trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, the expected profit, conditional
on receiving no low cost information from rivals, is higher under partial disclosure than
under full disclosure, i.e. ri eE{πp(θ)} + (1− ri)πp(∅) > ri eE{πf(θ)} + (1− ri)πf(∅).
On the other hand, firms are more likely to receive good news under full disclosure,
which increases expected profits under this regime, since πf(θ) > πf(∅). The trade-
oﬀ between these two conflicting eﬀects gives a critical value rN , with 0 < rN < r
∗
N .
For all r below (above) rN the expected profit under partial disclosure is greater
(smaller) than under full information sharing. While the firms expect higher profits
under partial disclosure than under full disclosure for r < rN , their expected profits
are even higher under the commitment to conceal all information. Therefore, for all
r < r∗N , the firms’ expected profits are highest under full concealment, as we show in
proposition 1 below.
Finally, the diﬀerence of expected profits under full concealment and partial disclo-
sure contains the following two principal components. On the one hand, conditional
on receiving no information from competitors, firms expect higher profits under partial
disclosure, since rE{πp(θ)}+ (1− r)πp(∅) > rE{πo(θ)}+ (1− r)πo(∅). But, on the
other hand, firms are more likely to receive bad news under partial disclosure, which
depresses their expected profits, since πp(θ) < πp(∅). Also for this profit comparison
we obtain a critical value rN , with r∗N ≤ rN ≤ 1, such that for all r below (above) rN
the expected profit under partial disclosure is smaller (greater) than under no pooling
of information. Although the expected profit under partial disclosure is higher than
under no disclosure for r > rN , it does not exceed the expected profit under full
disclosure. From this, and previous comparisons, we conclude that expected profits
under partial disclosure are never highest, as we show below.
Proposition 1 If ri = r ∈ (0, 1) for all i = 1, .., N , then a critical value r∗N exists,
with 0 < r∗2 < r
∗
3 < r
∗
n = 1 for n ≥ 4, such that ex ante expected profits are greater
(smaller) under full concealment than under full disclosure iﬀ r < r∗N (resp. r > r
∗
N),
i.e. Πf(r, r) Q Πo(r, r) if r Q r∗N . Furthermore, if N ∈ {2, 3}, then the firms’
ex ante expected profits are always greater under precommitment than under partial
information sharing, i.e. max{Πf(r, r),Πo(r, r)} > Πp(r, r) for all r ∈ (0, 1).
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In fact, numerical examples suggest that with exogenous, symmetric probabilities
of receiving information firms expect to be best oﬀ under precommitment also for
N ≥ 4. In section 5 we show that this result changes drastically after we endogenize
the firms’ probabilities of receiving information.
Our discussion above does not only have implications for the regimes under which
expected equilibrium profits are greatest, but also for the ranking of expected equilib-
rium profit levels in the remaining regimes. We obtain the following profit ranking:
(A) Πo(r, r) > Πp(r, r) > Πf(r, r) for all 0 < r < rN
(B) Πo(r, r) > Πf(r, r) > Πp(r, r) for all rN < r < r
∗
N
(C) Πf(r, r) > Πo(r, r) > Πp(r, r) for all r∗N < r < rN
(D) Πf(r, r) > Πp(r, r) > Πo(r, r) for all rN < r < 1.
In figures 0.a-c below we illustrate these cases for N ∈ {2, 3, 4}. In these figures,
regions AN -DN correspond to cases (A)-(D), respectively.
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[Ex Ante Expected Profits]
Numerical examples suggest that if the number of firms in the industry grows beyond
four, then the frontier rN rotates anti-clockwise around (1,0), i.e. A4 ⊃ A5 ⊃ ... ⊃
A∞ = ∅ and B4 ⊂ B5 ⊂ ... ⊂ B∞ = [0, 1]2 (and CN =DN = ∅ for all N ≥ 4).
Figures 0.a-c illustrate that there are always values of r such that expected equi-
librium profits are non-monotonic in the amount of information that is disclosed by
the firms. In particular, for all rN < r < rN (i.e. (r, q) ∈ BN ∪ CN in figures 0.a-c),
we obtain that min{Πf(r, r),Πo(r, r)} > Πp(r, r).
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3.3 Expected Welfare
Given symmetric information acquisition investments and fulfilled beliefs, i.e. ri = r
for all i = 1, .., N , the expected net consumers’ surpluses under information sharing,
no pooling of information, and partial information sharing are as follows:
CSf(r) =
1
2
N2
¡£
1− (1− r)N
¤
E
©
xf(θ)2
ª
+ (1− r)Nxf(∅)2
¢
, (3.14)
CSo(r) =
1
2
NX
m=0
µ
N
m
¶
rm(1− r)N−mE
©
[mxo(θ) + (N −m)xo(∅)]2
ª
, (3.15)
CSp(r) =
1
2
N2(1− q)
¡£
1− (1− r)N
¤
xp(θ)2 + (1− r)Nxp(∅)2
¢
+
1
2
q
NX
m=0
µ
N
m
¶
rm(1− r)N−m [mxp(θ) + (N −m)xp(∅)]2 , (3.16)
respectively. The comparison between CSf(r) and CSo(r) gives that the consumers’
surplus is highest under information sharing, i.e. CSf(r) > CSo(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1)
and N . The welfare eﬀect of moving from concealment to information sharing is the
net eﬀect of decreasing expected profits and increasing expected consumers’ surplus.
In fact, the increase in consumers’ surplus outweighs the negative profit eﬀect, i.e.
W f(r) ≥ W o(r), where W `(r) ≡ CS`(r) +NΠ`(r, r). Vives (1990) obtains a similar
intuitive result.
Proposition 2 If ri = r ∈ (0, 1) for all i = 1, .., N , then expected consumers’ surplus
and welfare are greater under full information sharing than under full concealment,
i.e. W f(r) > W o(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1).
4 Information Sharing
In this section we study the firms’ incentives to share information after firms received
their signals, i.e. we study the firms’ interim incentives to share information.
First, we can show that firms do not have an incentive to share all information. If
competitors have beliefs consistent with full disclosure, then an individual firm that
learned it is eﬃcient, Θi = θ, has an incentive to unilaterally conceal this information.
The concealment of low cost information may raise the rivals’ expected cost, and,
consequently, lower their outputs. This makes concealment of low cost information
profitable, given beliefs consistent with full disclosure.
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Full concealment is not chosen in equilibrium without ex ante commitment either.
If competitors have beliefs consistent with full concealment, then it is profitable for
an individual firm to unilaterally disclose a high production cost signal, Θi = θ. A
firm that discloses bad news discourages uninformed rivals, which increases the firm’s
expected profit.
The profitable unilateral deviations from full disclosure and full concealment sug-
gest that firms choose for partial disclosure in equilibrium. This is indeed the case,
as we show in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Neither full information sharing nor full concealment are equilibrium
disclosure strategies. An equilibrium exists in which firms disclose only high production
cost, while low cost is concealed, i.e. (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (∅, θ).
This result is consistent with the experimental results in Ackert et al (2000), and
is intuitive. Hence, the partial disclosure regime, that we previously imposed, emerges
endogenously in industries where firms choose not to precommit to information shar-
ing, or where they cannot precommit.
Proposition 1 shows that, for given (symmetric) levels of information acquisition,
partial disclosure would never be ex ante eﬃcient. However, in our model the level
of information acquisition is not given, but determined endogenously by investment
decisions. We study the firms’ information acquisition incentives in the next section.
5 Information Acquisition
In this section we compare the equilibrium information acquisition investments under
the three disclosure regimes. Subsequently, we compare the overall expected profits,
and overall expected welfare under the three regimes.
5.1 Equilibrium Investments
Under any disclosure regime ` ∈ {f, o, p}, firm i’s expected equilibrium profit Π`(ri, r),
as defined in (3.10), is linear in investment ri. The profit-maximizing investments are
therefore easily derived. The equilibrium information acquisition investments are
determined by the trade-oﬀ between the marginal cost of investment, η, and the
marginal revenue, ψ`(r), as defined in (3.11)-(3.13). For convenience we denote the
marginal revenue of information acquisition under regime ` when no information is
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acquired as follows:
ψ`0 ≡ ψ`(0), for ` ∈ {f, o, p}.
Notice that for extreme investments, we can rank the marginal revenues of information
acquisition as follows (see lemma 1):
0 = ψf(1) = ψp(1) < ψo(1) = ψf0 < ψ
o
0 < ψ
p
0.
In particular, under full information sharing the trade-oﬀ between the marginal
cost of information acquisition, η, and marginal revenue ψf(r), as defined in (3.11),
results in the following symmetric equilibrium investments:
rf =



1−
h
η
.
ψ
f
0
i 1
N−1
, if η ≤ ψf0 ,
0, otherwise.
(5.1)
With no pooling of information firm i’s marginal revenue of information acquisition
equals ψo(r), which is defined in (3.12). The symmetric equilibrium information
investment that result from profit-maximization and fulfillment of beliefs is:
ro =



1, if η ≤ ψf0
2
N−1
hp
ψo0/ η − 1
i
, if ψf0 < η < ψ
o
0,
0, otherwise.
(5.2)
Under partial disclosure the marginal revenue of information acquisition is ψp(r),
as in (3.13). The trade-oﬀ between marginal cost and revenue yields the following
equilibrium investments:
rp =
½
s.t. ψp(r) = η, if η < ψp0,
0, otherwise.
(5.3)
We illustrate the equilibrium information acquisition investments (for N ≥ 3)
in figure 1 below. Notice that equilibrium information acquisition investments are
non-increasing in the marginal cost of investment η, which is intuitive.
A firm’s incentive to acquire information is determined by two factors. First,
the value of acquiring information is determined by the expected profits from product
market competition. In particular, the diﬀerence between the expected profits of being
informed and the expected profit of remaining uninformed is an important element in
the firm’s marginal revenue of information acquisition. Secondly, the firm’s incentive
to acquire information is aﬀected by free-rider eﬀects due to information disclosure
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Figure 1: Information Acquisition Investments
by rivals. Naturally, the more information is disclosed by rivals, the lower a firm’s
incentive to acquire information. Both factors play an important role in the analysis
of a firm’s information acquisition incentives below.
The marginal revenue of information acquisition under full information sharing,
ψf(r), consists of two components. The first component is the value of the firm’s
own information acquisition in the absence of disclosure, i.e. E{πf(θ)}−πf(∅). This
value is reduced by the expected value of information disclosed by rivals, i.e. [1− (1−
r)N−1] · [E{πf(θ)}− πf(∅)]. This second component reflects the free-rider incentives
of acquiring public information. The value of information in the absence of disclosure
is greater under the no disclosure regime, i.e. E{πo(θ)} − πo(∅) > E{πf(θ)} −
πf(∅) as was shown in lemma 1. Moreover, there are no free-rider incentives in
information acquisition when firms do not share information. Both eﬀects imply that
the firms’ information acquisition incentives under no disclosure exceed those under
full disclosure. For the comparison between ψf and ψp we can make an analogous
decomposition of marginal revenue ψf(r) in two eﬀects. There may be instances (e.g.
for large r) where the first eﬀect gives bigger information acquisition incentives under
full information sharing than under partial disclosure. But in those instances the free-
rider eﬀect is the dominating eﬀect. Hence, the information acquisition investments
are lowest if information is shared, i.e. rf ≤ min{rp, ro}, as we show formally in
proposition 4.
The remaining comparison, between ro and rp, is more subtle. Again, the com-
parison gives a trade-oﬀ between two eﬀects. First, we compare the value of a firm’s
own information acquisition in the absence of disclosure, i.e. E{π`(θ)} − π`(∅) for
` ∈ {o, p}. Second, for ` = p this value is reduced by the value of information disclosed
by the firm’s rivals, (1 − q)[1 − (1 − r)N−1][πp(θ) − πp(∅)], which is negative. This
term represents the informational free-rider eﬀect under partial disclosure. On the
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one hand, if r is suﬃciently close to one, the value of information is greatest under
full concealment. In particular, if r → 1, the unraveling result applies under partial
disclosure, which reduces the value of information to zero. If firms do not share in-
formation, then the unraveling result does not apply, and information is still valuable
even if r→ 1. Hence, ψp(1) = 0 < ψo(1). On the other hand, if r is suﬃciently close to
zero, then the marginal revenue of information acquisition under partial disclosure is
greater than under no disclosure. In the limit when r → 0, the information free-rider
eﬀect under partial disclosure disappears, since rivals do not acquire information. The
information acquisition incentives in both regimes are then only determined by the
expected profits from product market competition. And, these profits are such that
ψp(0) > ψo(0), since firms expect fiercer product market competition under full con-
cealment, i.e. πp(θ) > πo(θ) and πp(Θ) = πo(Θ) for Θ ∈ {θ,∅} and r → 0 (see lemma
1). This implies that the relative size of information acquisition investments under
partial and no disclosure, depends on the marginal cost of information acquisition,
η. For suﬃciently low costs, i.e. η < η0, firms invest most in information acquisition
under no disclosure. But for suﬃciently high costs, i.e. η > η0, firms have greater
incentives to acquire information under partial disclosure. In fact, numerical examples
suggest that η0 = η0 = η0, as in figure 1. In the following proposition we characterize
η0 and η0, and summarize our findings on equilibrium information acquisition.
Proposition 4 Symmetric equilibria exist in which the information acquisition in-
vestments are as in (5.1)-(5.3). The investments under information sharing are low-
est, i.e. rf ≤ min{rp, ro}. Furthermore, there are critical values η0 and η0, with
ψ
f
0 < η
0 ≤ η0 < ψo0, such that firms invest less (more) in information acquisition
under partial disclosure than under full concealment for all η < η0 (η > η0).
We conclude from this result that for suﬃciently small costs of information acqui-
sition, η < η0, the information acquisition incentives are monotonic in the amount of
information disclosed in the industry. For these costs the free-rider incentives are suﬃ-
ciently great. However, for intermediate costs of information acquisition, η0 < η < ψo0,
we obtain a non-monotonicity result. The value of information is greatest under partial
disclosure, since expected product market profits under partial disclosure are greatest,
while the value of information from free-riding on rivals’ information is negative.
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5.2 Overall Expected Profits
For given levels of information acquisition investments, firms generically prefer not to
pool their information. After we substitute the equilibrium investments in the relevant
profit functions, we obtain the following overall expected profits (for r` ≡ (r`, r`) with
` ∈ {f, o, p}):
Πf(rf) = Πo(ro) =
½
E
©
πf(θ)
ª
− η, if η < ψf0
πf(∅), otherwise. (5.4)
Notice that the expected profits under information sharing and no-sharing are identi-
cal. If costs of investment are suﬃciently low (η < ψf0), firms are indiﬀerent between
acquiring and not acquiring information under full disclosure, i.e. ψf(rf) = η. There-
fore, fully disclosing firms expect the profit E
©
πf(θ)
ª
− η from disclosure by rivals,
and zero profits from their own information acquisition investments. Under no dis-
closure the marginal revenue of information acquisition exceeds its marginal cost, if
η < ψf0 . Hence, firms acquire information with certainty, which generates an expected
profit of E
©
πf(θ)
ª
− ψo(1) from disclosure by rivals, and ψo(1)− η from own infor-
mation acquisition. For higher costs of investment firms are uninformed under full
disclosure, while they are either indiﬀerent or prefer to remain uninformed under no
disclosure. In either case firms earn profit πf(∅). Hence, if firms could commit to
share or conceal information before they invest in information acquisition, they would
always be indiﬀerent between the two.
The expected overall profit under partial disclosure equals:
Πp(rp) =
½
E {πp(θ)|rp}− η, if η < ψp0
πf(∅), otherwise. (5.5)
We illustrate the overall expected profits in figure 2 below. For low marginal costs of
@
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Figure 2: Overall Expected Profits
investment firms acquire information with probabilities close to one. We showed in the
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discussion of proposition 1 that the expected profit is greater under full disclosure than
under partial disclosure, for given, high levels of information acquisition investments,
i.e. Πf(rp) > Πp(rp). On the other hand, we showed in proposition 4 that firms
invest less in information acquisition than under partial disclosure. This eﬀect lowers
the expected profits net of information acquisition costs under full disclosure, i.e.
Πf(rf) < Πf(rp), since rf < rp. The latter eﬀect dominates the former eﬀect for
suﬃciently low costs of information acquisition. In fact, there exists a critical cost
level, η∗ with ψf0 < η
∗ < ψp0, such that the overall expected profit under partial
disclosure is greatest, i.e. Πp(rp) > Πf(rf) = Πo(ro) for all 0 < η < η∗.
For suﬃciently high costs of information acquisition, the investments in informa-
tion acquisition are low. For given, low levels of information acquisition the expected
profit under full disclosure is lower than the expected profit under partial disclosure,
as follows from the discussion of proposition 1. However, firms invest less in infor-
mation acquisition under full disclosure than under partial disclosure. In particular,
rf = 0 while rp > 0 for η suﬃciently close to (and below) ψp0. This increases the firms’
revenues under partial disclosure even further. But, on the other hand, firms under
full disclosure forego the substantial cost of information acquisition, ηrp, that firms
under partial disclosure have to bear. For η suﬃciently close to ψp0, this cost outweighs
the higher revenues that firms earn under partial disclosure. Therefore, overall profits
are lower under partial disclosure. We show in the proposition below that there is a
critical cost of investment, η∗ with η∗ ≤ η∗ < ψp0, such that the overall expected profit
under partial information sharing is smallest, i.e. Πp(rp) < Πf(rf) = Πo(ro) for all
η∗ < η < ψp0. In fact, numerical examples suggest that η
∗ = η∗ = η∗, as in figure 2.
Proposition 5 For all η > 0 overall expected profits under full information sharing
and no sharing are identical, i.e. Πf(rf) = Πo(ro). Furthermore, there are critical
values η∗ and η∗ with ψf0 < η
∗ ≤ η∗ < ψp0, such that expected equilibrium profits are
highest (lowest) under partial information sharing if 0 < η < η∗ (η∗ < η < ψp0).
We conclude from this proposition that the overall expected profits are often non-
monotonic in the amount of information disclosed by the firms. If the costs of informa-
tion acquisition are suﬃciently low, then firms prefer not to precommit to information
disclosure. Hence, partial disclosure does not only emerge in markets where firms can-
not precommit, but it can also emerge since firms choose not to precommit. However,
for high costs of investment firms would prefer to precommit to full information shar-
ing or full concealment.6
6Obviously, if the costs of information acquisition are prohibitively high, i.e. η ≥ ψp0, firms are
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5.3 Overall Expected Welfare
The welfare comparison is less straightforward. On the one hand, expected welfare
for given levels of information acquisition investment is higher under information
sharing. But, on the other hand, firms invest more in information acquisition under
full concealment, which increases expected welfare. The positive eﬀect of information
concealment on the information acquisition incentives outweighs the negative eﬀect,
i.e. W f(rf) ≤ W o(ro). Hence, endogenizing information acquisition reverses the
welfare result of section 3. Persico (2000) makes a related observation for auction
models with aﬃliated values. For a given information structure the second price
auction yields a higher expected revenue to an auctioneer than the first price auction.
But the first price auction gives a greater incentive to acquire information, which may
reverse the expected revenue ranking.
We can find also cases in which overall expected welfare is lower under precom-
mitment than under partial disclosure. This result is due to the non-monotonicity of
information acquisition incentives in the cost η. If the information acquisition cost
is between ψo0 and ψ
p
0, then firms are uninformed under the precommitment regimes
(rf = ro = 0), while they are informed with a positive probability under partial
disclosure (rp > 0). We show below that in such a case the expected welfare under
partial disclosure may exceed the welfare of remaining uninformed.
Proposition 6 The overall expected welfare under full information sharing never
exceeds the overall expected welfare under no information sharing, i.e. W f(rf) ≤
W o(ro), and the inequality is strict iﬀ η < ψo0. Furthermore, there exist critical values
ηo < ψp0 and N
o ∈ {2, 3, 4, ...}, such that for all N > No and ηo < η < ψp0 overall
expected welfare is highest under partial disclosure, i.e. W o(ro) < W p(rp).
Hence, there are cases where expected welfare is greatest under partial disclosure.
In these cases a welfare-maximizing antitrust authority should rule against the forma-
tion of trade associations that facilitate commitment to share or conceal information.
In proposition 5 we showed that for a high cost of information acquisition firms pre-
fer to precommit to either fully share or fully conceal their information. Therefore,
there is a conflict of interest between the firms and a welfare-maximizing antitrust
authority for suﬃciently high information acquisition costs. Whereas firms prefer
to precommit, the antitrust authority prefers to rule against such precommitment.
indiﬀerent between disclosure regimes, since they never acquire any information, and expected profits
equal πf (∅) under all regimes..
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These results would call for the intervention by an antitrust authority if the cost of
information acquisition is high. That is, there are cases where partial disclosure may
arise because an antitrust authority prefers to rule against agreements by firms on
information sharing.
A second implication of this proposition is that overall expected welfare is never
maximized by full disclosure. A welfare-maximizing antitrust authority should there-
fore always prohibit agreements which enable firms to precommit to share all their
information.
6 Conclusion
We have studied production and disclosure incentives of Cournot oligopolists. The pa-
per studies the interaction between information acquisition, strategic disclosure and
supply in a Cournot oligopoly. We have seen that the endogeneity of information
acquisition and information disclosure aﬀects the industry’s profits and welfare sub-
stantially. Antitrust authorities should take this into account when they choose a
disclosure regulation regime for oligopolistic markets. The paper suggest a number of
conditions that are important for a policy maker’s evaluation of information disclosure
regimes.
The emergence of partial disclosure in equilibrium is consistent with theoretical
studies, such as Darrough (1993), and the experimental results of Ackert et al (2001).
Moreover, we have been able to characterize the profit and welfare eﬀects of the
disclosure strategies obtained in these studies. We have shown that, even in markets
where firms can precommit, partial disclosure may emerge since firms prefer not to
choose either precommitment disclosure regime. Furthermore, there are cases where
welfare is maximized under partial disclosure. Hence, a welfare-maximizing antitrust
authority should rule against precommitment to share or conceal information (e.g.
through the establishment of a trade association) in such cases.
We could extend the analysis by considering asymmetric equilibria. If we allow for
asymmetric investments in information acquisition, the firms’ equilibrium disclosure
rules may become asymmetric too, as is illustrated in Jansen (2002). Alternatively,
the eﬀects of the introduction of convex costs of information acquisition, as in Jansen
(2002), could be studied. Both extensions are potentially interesting, but they would
make the analysis less tractible. Such extensions await future research.
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A Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of the main propositions of the paper.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) We show that xf(∅) < xp(∅):
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r][xp(∅)− xf(∅)]
= [2 + (N − 1)r]
³
E(θ)− eE(θ)´− (N − 1)req (E(θ)− θ)
= [2(eq − q)− (N − 1)rq(1− eq)] (θ − θ) = q(1− q)(θ − θ)
q + (1− q)(1− r)N−1DN(r),
with
DN(r) ≡ [1− (1− r)N−1]2− (1− r)N−1(N − 1)r > 0 for all N ≥ 2, (A.1)
since DN(r) = 0, and DN+1(r)−DN(r) = r(1− r)N−1(1 +Nr) > 0. This inequality,
together with first-order conditions (3.3) for Θi = θ and (3.6), gives xp(θ) < xo(θ).
All remaining inequalities are straightforward.
(ii) First, using the following properties
∂eq
∂r
=
(N − 1)eq(1− eq)
1− r , and (A.2)
xp(θ) = xf(θ) +
[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)](θ − θ)
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r] , (A.3)
it is straightforward to show that:
∂xp(θ)
∂r
=
−(1− eq)(N − 1)[2 + (1 + eq)(N − 1)](θ − θ)
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]2 < 0. (A.4)
Second, since we can rewrite xp(∅) as follows
xp(∅) = xf(θ) + 2eq(θ − θ)
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r] , (A.5)
we obtain:
∂xp(∅)
∂r
=
2eq(1− eq)(N − 1)[1 +Nr](θ − θ)
(1− r)(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]2 > 0. (A.6)
The remaining monotonicity results, ∂xo(θ)/∂r < 0 and ∂xo(θ)/∂r > 0, follow directly
from expression (3.4) for Θi = θ and Θi = θ, respectively. The equalities for r ∈ {0, 1}
are obvious.
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(iii) The expected equilibrium output under full and no disclosure are:
E{Xf} = [1− (1− r)N ]NE{xf(θ)}+ (1− r)NNxf(∅) = Nxf(∅),
E{Xo} = rNE{xo(θ)}+ (1− r)Nxo(∅) = Nxf(∅), respectively.
It is straightforward to rewrite the expected equilibrium industry output under partial
disclosure as follows:
E{Xp} = (1− q)N ¡[1− (1− r)N ]xp(θ) + (1− r)Nxp(∅)¢+ qN [rxp(θ) + (1− r)xp(∅)]
= Nxf(∅)− N(N − 1)(1− r)
Nr(1− q)
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r] ³ eE(θ)− θ´ .
We conclude from these expressions that: E{Xf} = E{Xo} > E{Xp}. ¤
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1 (Expected Profit)
We first compare the expected profits under full disclosure and no disclosure. Since
πf(∅) = πo(∅), and since ψf(r) and ψo(r), as defined in (3.11) and (3.12), can be
written as follows
ψf(r) = (1− r)N−1 · q(1− q)(θ − θ)
2
(N + 1)2
and ψo(r) =
q(1− q)(θ − θ)2
[2 + (N − 1)r]2 , (A.7)
we can rewrite the diﬀerence between the profits under no and full information sharing
as follows (for ri = r):
Πo(r, r)−Πf(r, r) = r
£
ψo(0)− ψf(r)
¤
+ (1− r)
£
1− (1− r)N−1
¤
ψf(0)
= rψo(r)−
£
1− (1− r)N
¤
ψf(0)
=
q(1− q)(θ − θ)2
(N + 1)2[2 + (N − 1)r]2GN(r), (A.8)
with
GN(r) ≡ r(N + 1)2 − [1− (1− r)N ][2 + (N − 1)r]2. (A.9)
Hence, Πo(r, r) > Πf(r, r) iﬀ GN(r) > 0. For N = 2 we obtain: G2(r) = r(1 −
r)(1− 3r− r2), and consequently Πo(r, r) > Πf(r, r) iﬀ r < r∗2, where r∗2 is the root of
1−3r−r2 = 0. Similarly, G3(r) = 4r(1−r)2(1−r−r2), which gives Πo(r, r) > Πf(r, r)
iﬀ r < r∗3, where r
∗
3 is the root of 1 − r − r2 = 0. For N ≥ 4 we rewrite inequality
GN(r) > 0 as follows:
[2 + (N − 1)r]
r
1− (1− r)N
r
< N + 1, (A.10)
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and we show that inequality (A.10) holds for all r ∈ (0, 1), since its left hand side is
increasing in r, and Πf(r, r) = Πo(r, r) for r = 1. Diﬀerentiation of the left hand side
of (A.10) gives:
∂
∂r
Ã
[2 + (N − 1)r]
r
1− (1− r)N
r
!
=
FN(r) ·
q
1−(1−r)N
r
2r [1− (1− r)N ] , with
FN(r) ≡ (1− r)N−1
£
(N2 − 1)r2 + (N − 1)r + 2
¤
− [2− (N − 1)r]. (A.11)
We show by induction that FN(r) > 0 for all r and N ≥ 4. First, it is easy to
show that: F4(r) = r2[12− 38r + 42r2 − 15r3] > 0 for all r. Furthermore, for any N :
FN+1(r)−FN(r) = r[1−fN(r)], with fN(r) ≡ (1−r)N−1 [N(N + 2)r2 − (N + 1)r + 1].
Function fN(r) has local maxima for r = 0 and r = 2N+1 , since:
f 0N(r) = −N(1− r)N−2[(N + 1)r − 2][(N + 2)r − 1].
Hence, we obtain: fN(r) ≤ max
©
fN(0), fN(
2
N+1
)
ª
= 1 for all r. This implies that
FN+1(r)− FN(r) ≥ 0, and Πo(r, r) > Πf(r, r), for all N ≥ 4.
Second, the diﬀerence between the expected profit under full disclosure and partial
disclosure equals:
Πf(ri, r)−Πp(ri, r) =
riq
£
πf(θ)− πp(θ)
¤
+ (1− ri)
£
q + (1− q)(1− r)N−1
¤ £
πf(∅)− πp(∅)
¤
+(1− ri)q
£
1− (1− r)N−1
¤ £
πf(θ)− πf(∅)
¤
. (A.12)
The terms in expression (A.12) can be written as follows:
πf(θ)− πp(θ) = xf(θ)2 −
Ã
xf(θ) +
(N − 1)(1− r)( eE(θ)− θ)
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]
!2
πf(∅)− πp(∅) =
µ
xf(θ)− E(θ)− θ
N + 1
¶2
−
Ã
xf(θ)− [2 + (N − 1)r](
eE(θ)− θ)
(N + 1)[2 + (N − 1)r]
!2
πf(θ)− πf(∅) = xf(θ)2 −
µ
xf(θ)− E(θ)− θ
N + 1
¶2
.
Substitution of these terms in (A.12) gives:
Πf(r, r)−Πp(r, r) = (1− r)(1− eq)q(1− q)(θ − θ)2
(N + 1)2[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]2
µ
r
eq
q
HN(r)−GN(r)
¶
, (A.13)
with
HN(r) ≡
£
p+ (1− p)(1− r)N−1
¤
[(N + 1)2 − 2(N − 1)(2 + (N − 1)r)]
−[(1− r)N + pr2](N − 1)2. (A.14)
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HN(r) is linear in p, with HN(r) = (1− r)N−1 [4− r(N − 1)2] for p = 0, and HN(r) =
(N − 1)
£
(1− r)N(N − 1) + r(N − 1) + 4
¤
> 0 for p = 1. Clearly, if N ∈ {2, 3},
then HN(r) > 0 for all p, r ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, we showed before that if N ∈ {2, 3}
and r ≥ r∗N , then GN(r) ≤ 0. Consequently, if N ∈ {2, 3} and r ≥ r∗N , then
Πf(r, r) > Πp(r, r).
Finally, the diﬀerence of expected profits under full concealment and partial dis-
closure is:
Πo(r, r)−Πp(r, r) =
£
Πo(r, r)−Πf(r, r)
¤
+
£
Πf(r, r)−Πp(r, r)
¤
=
q(1− q)(θ − θ)2
(N + 1)2[2 + (N − 1)r]2[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]2AN(r) ·GN(r)
+
r(1− r)(1− eq)eq(1− q)(θ − θ)2
(N + 1)2[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]2HN(r), (A.15)
where
AN(r) ≡ [2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]2 − (1− r)(1− eq)[2 + (N − 1)r]2
= (1− eq)r £(N − 1)2r2 + (4− (N − 1)eq) (N − 1)r + 4¤+ 4eq. (A.16)
Hence, if N ≤ 5, then AN(r) ≥ 0 for all r ∈ (0, 1). Recall that if N ∈ {2, 3} and
r < r∗N , then HN(r) ≥ 0 and GN(r) > 0. Therefore, if N ∈ {2, 3} and r < r∗N ,
Πo(r, r) > Πp(r, r). We showed previously that if N ∈ {2, 3} and r ≥ r∗N , then
Πf(r, r) > Πp(r, r). Hence, max{Πf(r, r),Πo(r, r)} > Πp(r, r) for all r ∈ (0, 1). ¤
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2 (Expected Welfare)
The consumers’ surpluses under full and no information sharing can be rewritten as
follows (using E{xo(θ)} = xo(∅)):
CSf(r) =
1
2
N2
¡£
1− (1− r)N
¤
E
©
xf(θ)2
ª
+ (1− r)Nxf(∅)2
¢
=
1
2
N2
¡
πf(∅) +
£
1− (1− r)N
¤
ψf(0)
¢
, and (A.17)
CSo(r) =
1
2
NX
m=0
µ
N
m
¶
rm(1− r)N−mE
©
[Nxo(∅) +m (xo(θ)− xo(∅))]2
ª
=
1
2
Ã
N2xo(∅)2 +
NX
m=0
µ
N
m
¶
rm(1− r)N−mm2
£
E{xo(θ)2}− xo(∅)2¤!
=
1
2
¡
N2πo(∅) +Nr[1 + (N − 1)r]ψo(r)
¢
. (A.18)
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Hence, after substituting the expressions of (A.7) in (A.17) and (A.18), the diﬀerence
between expected consumers’ surplus under full and no information sharing reduces
to:
CSf(r)− CSo(r) = 1
2
Nq(1− q)(θ − θ)2
µ
N [1− (1− r)N ]
(N + 1)2
− r[1 + (N − 1)r]
[2 + (N − 1)r]2
¶
.
(A.19)
The diﬀerence in welfare under full disclosure and full concealment equals therefore:
W f(r)−W o(r) = CSf(r) +NΠf(r, r)− [CSo(r) +NΠo(r, r)] (A.20)
∝ (N + 2)[1− (1− r)
N ]
(N + 1)2
− r[3 + (N − 1)r]
[2 + (N − 1)r]2 ∝ KN(r),
with
KN(r) ≡ (N + 2)[1− (1− r)N ][2 + (N − 1)r]2 − [3 + (N − 1)r]r[2 + (N − 1)r]2.
(A.21)
Clearly, for all N and r: KN(r) > GN(r), with GN(r) as in (A.9). Hence, if N ≥ 4,
then KN(r) > 0 since GN(r) > 0, as shown in proposition 1. Moreover, K2(r) =
r(1− r)(1 + 2r)(5 + 2r) > 0 and K3(r) = 4r(1− r)(3 + 10r − 5r3) > 0. ¤
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3 (Interim Disclosure Incentives)
First, we first show that firms do not have an incentive to share all information.
Suppose that θ = θ, firm i is informed, and all other firms share information and have
beliefs consistent with full disclosure. If there is a rival j 6= i who is informed, then
firm i is indiﬀerent between disclosing and concealing, since firm i always earns πf(θ).
If all rivals are uninformed (Θj = ∅ for all i 6= j), firm i strictly prefers to conceal. If
firm i would disclose its information, all firms would supply xf(θ), and consequently
firm i would earn profit πf(θ). However, if firm i conceals its information, all rivals
supply xfj (∅). Firm i’s best response to these quantities is to supply x0 where:
x0 ≡ xf(θ) + (N − 1)(E(θ)− θ)
2(N + 1)
, i.e. x0 > xf(θ).
Firm i’s expected profit from these outputs equals (x0)2, which is clearly higher than
its profit after disclosure, xf(θ)2. Hence unilateral concealment of Θi = θ is profitable,
and consequently firms do not share all information in equilibrium.
Second, we show that firms do not have an incentive to conceal all information.
Suppose that θ = θ, firm i is informed, and all other firms conceal information and
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have beliefs consistent with full concealment. If firm i would conceal its information,
firm i would expect to earn profit πo(θ). However, if firm i discloses its information,
all firms supply xf(θ), and firm i earns πf(θ), which exceeds πo(θ), since xf(θ) >
xo(θ), as shown in lemma 1. Hence unilateral disclosure of Θi = θ is profitable, and
consequently firms do not conceal all information in equilibrium.
Finally, we show that partial disclosure is an equilibrium disclosure strategy. Sup-
pose all firms have beliefs consistent with partial disclosure, and all rivals of firm i
disclose partially. Consider the two possible unilateral deviations from partial disclo-
sure. First, firm i with Θi = θ can choose to disclose. If firm i discloses, it earns
profit πf(θ). If firm i conceals, it expects to earn πp(θ). Clearly πp(θ) > πf(θ), and
therefore firms have no incentive to unilaterally disclose a low cost. Second, firm i
with Θi = θ can deviate by concealing its information. Such a unilateral deviation
only aﬀects firm i’s expected profit if all its rivals are uninformed. In that case, firm
i’s rivals supply xpj(∅) for all j 6= i. Firm i’s best response to these outputs is:
x00i ≡
α− θ
N + 1
− (N − 1)eq(θ − θ)
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r] < xf(θ).
Firm i’s expected profit after concealment of high cost information is (x00i )
2, which
is clearly smaller than the profit, πf(θ), earned after disclosure. Hence there is no
profitable unilateral deviation from partial disclosure. ¤
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4 (Information Acquisition)
First, notice that the expected equilibrium profits in (3.10) are linear in ri for each
regime ` ∈ {f, o, p}. Hence, firm i’s profit-maximizing investments are as follows:
ri ∈



{1}, if η < ψ`(r)
[0, 1], if η = ψ`(r)
{0}, otherwise,
(A.22)
for each regime ` ∈ {f, o, p}. Hence, the investments in expressions (5.1), (5.3) and
(5.2) are chosen in a symmetric equilibrium, if the marginal revenues of information
acquisition are decreasing in r. Under full information sharing and no information
sharing this is the case, since ψf(r) and ψo(r) in (A.7) are clearly decreasing in r.
Under partial information sharing we need to evaluate:
eq/q
2
· dψ
p(r)
dr
=
1
2
µeq∂πp(θ)
∂r
− ∂π
p(∅)
∂r
+
(N − 1)(1− eq)
1− r
£
πp(∅)− πp(θ)
¤¶
(A.23)
= eqxp(θ)∂xp(θ)
∂r
− xp(∅)∂x
p(∅)
∂r
+
(N − 1)(1− eq)
2(1− r)
£
xp(∅)2 − xp(θ)2
¤
.
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Using the results from lemma 1 (ii), i.e. expressions (A.3), (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6), we
can show that:
(1−r)(N+1)2[2+(1−eq)(N−1)r]2
2q(1−eq)(N−1) · dψp(r)/dr
= −
µ
α− θ + [2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)] (θ − θ)
2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r
¶
[2 + (1 + eq)(N − 1)](1− r)
−
µ
α− θ + 2eq(θ − θ)
2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r
¶
2 ([2 + (N − 1)r]− (1− r))
+
µ
α− θ + eq(θ − θ)
2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r
¶
2[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r], (A.24)
which clearly is negative for all r ∈ [0, 1).
For the investment comparisons it suﬃces to compare the marginal revenues of
information acquisition, since the marginal cost remains the same in all regimes. First,
we prove that rf ≤ rp by showing that: ψp(r) > ψf(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1). The diﬀerence
in marginal revenues under full and partial information sharing can be decomposed
as follows:
ψp(r)− ψf(r) = q
£
πp(θ)− πf(θ)
¤
+ q
£
1− (1− r)N−1
¤ £
πf(θ)− πf(∅)
¤
−
£
q + (1− q)(1− r)N−1
¤ £
πp(∅)− πf(∅)
¤
. (A.25)
Clearly, the first term of this expression is positive. Hence, it suﬃces to show that the
sum of the second (positive) and third (negative) terms is positive. As shown in the
proof of lemma 1, we can rewrite the last term of (A.25) as follows (for r ∈ (0, 1)):£
q + (1− q)(1− r)N−1
¤ £
πp(∅)− πf(∅)
¤
=
q(1− q)(θ − θ)F∅(N)
£
xp(∅) + xf(∅)
¤
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]
<
q
£
1− (1− r)N−1
¤
(1− q)(θ − θ)2
£
xp(∅) + xf(∅)
¤
(N + 1)[2 + (1− eq)(N − 1)r]
<
q
£
1− (1− r)N−1
¤
(1− q)(θ − θ)
£
xp(∅) + xf(∅)
¤
(N + 1)
< q
£
1− (1− r)N−1
¤ (1− q)(θ − θ)
N + 1
£
xf(θ) + xf(∅)
¤
= q
£
1− (1− r)N−1
¤ £
πf(θ)− πf(∅)
¤
.
To complete the proof of rf ≤ min{rp, ro}, we observe that rf < 1 = ro if 0 < η ≤ ψf0 ,
rf = 0 < ro if ψf0 < η < ψ
o
0, and r
f = ro = 0 for all other η.
Finally, we notice that for all 0 < η < ψp0: 0 < r
p < 1. Consequently, for all
0 < η ≤ ψf0 we have ro = 1 > rp, while for all ψo0 ≤ η < ψ
p
0 investments are such
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that ro = 0 < rp. Continuity of marginal revenue functions ψo(r) and ψp(r) therefore
gives the existence of values η0 and η0 immediately. ¤
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5 (Overall Profits)
First, expression (5.4) follows immediately from substitution of (5.1) in (3.10) for
` = f , and (5.2) in (3.10) for ` = o. Second, for 0 < η ≤ ψf0 , equilibrium information
acquisition investments are such that rp ∈ (0, 1). Hence, lemma 1 (i) implies that
πp(θ) > πf(θ), and, consequently, we obtain:
Πp(rp) = E {πp(θ)|rp}− η > E{πf(θ)}− η = Πf(rf) = Πo(ro). (A.26)
Since Πp(rp) is continuous in η, there exists a critical value η∗ > ψf0 such that Π
p(rp) >
Πf(rf) for all η < η∗.
Finally, for η ∈ [ψf0 ,ψ
p
0) we have: Π
f(rf) = Πo(ro) = πf(∅) and Πp(rp) =
E {πp(θ)|rp} − η, with rp such that η = ψp(r). The first derivative of Πp(rp) to η
equals:
dΠp(rp)
dη
= q
∂πp(θ)
∂r
· dr
p
dη
¯¯¯¯
r=rp
− 1 = q∂π
p(θ)
∂r
· 1
dψp(r)/dr
¯¯¯¯
r=rp
− 1
=
−∂πp(∅)/∂r + (N−1)(1−eq)
1−r
£
πp(∅)− πp(θ)
¤
−dψp(r)/dr · eq/q
¯¯¯¯
¯
r=rp
, (A.27)
since dψp(r)/dr is as in expression (A.23). Using expressions (A.5) and (A.6) of lemma
1, we obtain the following:
lim
η↑ψp0
dΠp(rp)
dη
=
1
−dψp(0)/dr
µ
(N − 1)(1− q)
£
πp(∅)− πp(θ)
¤
− ∂π
p(∅)
∂r
¶¯¯¯¯
r=0
(A.28)
=
q(1− q)(N − 1)(θ − θ)(α− θ)
−dψp(0)/dr · 2(N + 1)2 > 0,
since dψp(0)/dr < 0, as was shown in the proof of proposition 4. Moreover, lim
η↑ψp0
Πp(rp) =
Πp(0, 0) = πf(∅) and Πp(rp) is continuous in η. Hence, there exists a critical value
η∗ ∈ (ψf0 ,ψ
p
0) such that Π
p(rp) < πf(∅) = Πf(rf) for all η ∈ (η∗,ψp0). ¤
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6 (Overall Welfare)
(1) The comparison of expected welfare under full and no information sharing reduces
to the comparison between expected consumers’ surpluses, since Πf(rf) = Πo(ro) for
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all η, as proposition 5 shows. First, consider the overall expected consumers’ surplus
for 0 < η ≤ ψf0 . In that case the expected overall consumers’ surpluses reduce to:
CSf(rf) =
1
2
N2
£¡
1− (1− rf)N
¢
E{xf(θ)2}+ (1− rf)Nxf(∅)2¤
=
1
2
N2
£
E{πf(θ)}− η ¡1− rf¢¤ , and (A.29)
CSo(ro) = CSo(1) =
1
2
N2E{πf(θ)}. (A.30)
Since rf < 1 for 0 < η ≤ ψf0 , we obtain that CSf(rf) < CSo(ro). Second, we
compare expected consumers’ surplus for ψf0 < η < ψ
o
0. In this case, no informa-
tion is acquired under full disclosure, and consequently expected consumers’ surplus
equals: CSf(rf) = CSf(0) = 1
2
N2xf(∅)2. Hence, the diﬀerence in expected overall
consumers’ surpluses (A.29) and (A.30) can be rewritten to:
CSf(rf)− CSo(ro) = 1
2
NX
m=0
µ
N
m
¶
(ro)m(1− ro)N−m · (A.31)
· ¡N2xf(∅)2 − E ©[mxo(θ) + (N −m)xo(∅)]2ª¢ ,
where N2xf(∅)2 −E
©
[mxo(θ) + (N −m)xo(∅)]2
ª
= N2xf(∅)2 − E
©
[Nxo(∅) +m (xo(θ)− xo(∅))]2
ª
= −E {m (xo(θ)− xo(∅)) [2Nxo(∅) +m (xo(θ)− xo(∅))]}
= −m2E
©
[xo(θ)− xo(∅)]2
ª
< 0, for all r and m > 0.
Since ro > 0 for η < ψo0, this implies: CS
f(rf) < CSo(ro) for ψf0 < η < ψ
o
0. Conse-
quently, for all 0 < η ≤ ψo0, we obtain: W f(rf) < W o(ro). Clearly, for all η ≥ ψo0,
firms acquire no information under both regimes, and therefore: CSf(rf) = CSo(ro).
(2) For ψo0 < η < ψ
p
0, r
f = ro = 0, while rp > 0 is such that ψp(rp) = η. For
such η welfare under precommitment equals: W o(0) = W f(0) = 1
2
N(N + 2)xf(∅)2.
The expected welfare under partial disclosure approaches W o(0) if η → ψp0, i.e.
limη↑ψp0 {W p(rp)} = W o(0). Hence, there exists a critical cost ηo such that W p(rp) >
W o(0) for all ηo < η < ψp0, if limη↑ψp0 {dW p(rp)/dη} < 0. We show in the remainder
of the proof that this is the case if N is suﬃciently big.
Since limη↑ψp0 r
p = 0, the first derivative of welfare with respect to the cost of
information acquisition converges to:
lim
η↑ψp0
dW p(rp)
dη
= lim
η↑ψp0
µ
drp
dη
· dW
p(rp)
dr
¶
=
1
dψp(0)/dr
·
µ
dCSp(0)
dr
+N
dΠp(0)
dr
¶
. (A.32)
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The first derivative of consumers’ surplus (3.16) with respect to the information ac-
quisition investment can be rewritten to the following:
dCSp(0)
dr
= −N
2
2
µ
N(1− q)
£
πp(∅)− πp(θ)
¤
− ∂π
p(∅)
∂r
¶¯¯¯¯
r=0
+
1
2
Nq [xp(θ) + (2N − 1)xp(∅)] [xp(θ)− xp(∅)]
¯¯¯¯
r=0
. (A.33)
Combining this expression with profit derivative (A.28), we obtain the following:
dW p(0)
dr
= −N
2
[(N + 2)(N − 1) +N ](1− q)
£
πf(∅)− πf(θ)
¤
+
N
2
µ
(N + 2)
∂πp(∅)
∂r
+ q
£
xo(θ) + (2N − 1)xf(∅)
¤ £
xo(θ)− xf(∅)
¤¶¯¯¯¯
r=0
.
It is straightforward, though tedious, to rewrite this expression to the following:
dW p(0)
dr
=
−Nq(1− q)(θ − θ)
8(N + 1)2
£
4(3N − 2)(α− θ)−M(N, q)(θ − θ)
¤
, (A.34)
where
M(N) ≡ 2(N + 1) + (N − 1)[2q(2N + 1) + (1− q)(N + 1)]. (A.35)
SinceM(N) is quadratic inN , there exists a critical valueNo such that for allN > No:
dW p(0)/dr > 0. This, in combination with the fact that dψp(0)/dr < 0, proves the
proposition. ¤
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